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Library Note 
 
Leaving the European Union: Future UK-EU Relationship  
 
On 1 December 2016, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate the “best options for the United 
Kingdom’s future relationship with the European Union following the referendum vote to leave”. 
 
The Prime Minister, Theresa May, has confirmed that the Government intend to pursue a bespoke 
agreement between the UK and EU during the forthcoming negotiation on the UK’s withdrawal from 
the bloc. The Prime Minister has also stated that the Government will not be providing a “running 
commentary” on the negotiation, despite calls from other parties for more details on the Government’s 
negotiating strategy. However, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, has 
set out the Government’s four “overarching strategic objectives” for the UK’s negotiations to leave the 
European Union and for the future relationship between the UK and the EU: 
 
 Bringing back control of our laws to Parliament. 
 Bringing back control of decisions over immigration to the UK. 
 Maintaining the strong security cooperation we have with the EU. 
 Establishing the freest possible market in goods and services with the EU and the rest of 
the world. 
 
This briefing explores each of these four objectives. It identifies a number of possible options available to 
the Government in trying to meet them and sets out some of the issues that may arise in each area. 
Issues covered in the first section on law making include the role of Parliament in invoking Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in repealing and reviewing domestic legislation before and 
after the UK’s withdrawal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union following the 
UK’s exit, and the possible effect of the withdrawal on the devolved administrations. The second section 
on immigration considers whether the UK may maintain free movement of people in any future 
agreement with the EU and examines the potential impact of the UK’s withdrawal on both UK citizens 
in the EU and EU citizens in the UK. The third section on security cooperation discusses whether 
current security arrangements between the UK and the EU, including the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy and police and security cooperation, will remain following 
the UK’s exit. The fourth section on trade considers the UK’s future trade relationship with the EU and 
the rest of the world after withdrawal, including issues relating to the uncertainty raised by the 
forthcoming negotiation and the possible implications for different sectors of any change in the level of 
access to the single market following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.  
 
In light of the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the UK’s forthcoming negotiations to leave the EU 
and discussions around the future relationship between the UK and the EU, this briefing should not be 
interpreted as a comprehensive survey, but rather a starting point which identifies pertinent issues 
relevant to the subject.  
 
Thomas Brown | Eren Waitzman 
25 November 2016 
LLN 2016/063 
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1. Law Making 
 
1.1 Current Situation 
 
As the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee has observed, the UK is a ‘dualist’ 
state.1 As such, a treaty ratified by the Government does not alter UK law “unless and until it is 
incorporated into national law by legislation”. The Committee has noted that this is a 
constitutional requirement: until incorporating legislation is enacted, the national courts have 
no power to enforce treaty rights and obligations either on behalf of the Government or a 
private individual.2 
 
As per this ‘dualist’ approach, the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) is the legislation 
passed by the UK Parliament which gives legal authority for EU law to have effect as national 
law in the UK.3 The ECA defines the legal relationship between the two otherwise separate 
spheres of law, and without it EU law could not become part of national law.4  
 
The ECA gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.5 It requires UK courts to refer 
judgment to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in cases where the interpretation of EU law is 
in doubt. The Institute for Government has noted that “all primary legislation enacted by the 
UK Parliament after the [ECA] came into force on 1 January 1973 has effect subject to the 
requirements of EU law. This means that the courts are obliged to strike down legislation 
which is inconsistent with EU law”.6  
 
The ECA remains in force, though the Government has stated that it intends to repeal it with a 
‘Great Repeal Bill’ to be introduced in the 2017–18 session.7 This Bill is expected to provide for 
repeal of the ECA to take effect from the date of the UK’s exit from the EU.   
 
1.2 Issues  
 
Invoking Article 50  
 
The Government has stated that it will pursue withdrawal from the EU “in the way agreed in 
law by the UK and other member states, which means following the process set out in 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union [TEU]”.8 Section 1 of Article 50 states that “any 
member state may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
                                            
1 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The EU Bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty, 7 December 2010, 
HC 633-I of session 2010–11, p 5. In a ‘monist’ state, such as France, a treaty obligation becomes directly 
applicable in domestic law simply by virtue of the act of ratification. 
2 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The EU Bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty, 7 December 2010, 
HC 633-I of session 2010–11, p 5. 
3 Institute for Government, ‘Brexit Brief: The 1972 European Communities Act’, accessed 18 November 2016. 
4 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The EU Bill and Parliamentary Sovereignty, 7 December 2010, 
HC 633-I of session 2010–11, p 5. 
5 Institute for Government, ‘Brexit Brief: The 1972 European Communities Act’, accessed 18 November 2016. 
6 ibid. 
7 Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Government Announces End of European Communities Act’, 2 
October 2016. 
8 HL Hansard, 7 November 2016, col 929. For further information on Article 50 see: House of Lords Constitution 
Committee, The Invoking of Article 50, 13 September 2016, HL Paper 44 of session 2016–17. 
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constitutional requirements”.9 However, there is disagreement as to what the UK’s 
“constitutional requirements” are in this regard and the issue is currently before the courts.10  
 
On 3 November 2016, the High Court of Justice ruled that the “Secretary of State does not 
have power under the Crown’s prerogative to give notice pursuant to Article 50 of the [TEU] 
for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union”.11 Lord Bridges of Headley, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department for Exiting the European Union, has 
stated that the “logical conclusion to draw from the High Court judgment is that legislation 
would be necessary” to invoke Article 50, although the Government was appealing and “hope 
that the Supreme Court will rule differently”.12  
 
Permission for the Government to appeal the High Court judgment was granted by the 
Supreme Court on 8 November 2016, when it was also confirmed that “all eleven Justices will 
sit on the panel considering this appeal, which will be chaired by Lord Neuberger, President of 
the Supreme Court”.13 The case has been listed for 5 to 8 December 2016 and the Supreme 
Court has stated that it expects that a decision “will follow in the New Year”.14 
 
Following the High Court judgment, the Government stated that it still intended to invoke 
Article 50 by the end of March.15  
 
Repealing and Reviewing Domestic Legislation 
 
The European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) remains in force, though the Government has 
stated that it intends to repeal the Act with a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ which will “end ECJ jurisdiction 
in the UK”.16  
 
  
                                            
9 EUR-Lex, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union: Title VI—Final Provisions—Article 50, 
accessed 21 November 2016.  
10 For information on these arguments see: House of Lords Library, Leaving the EU: Parliament’s Role in the Process, 
4 July 2016. The issue before the Court was whether “as a matter of UK constitutional law, the Government is 
entitled to give notice of a decision to leave the European Union under Article 50 by exercise of the Crown’s 
prerogative powers and without reference to Parliament” (High Court of Justice, R (Miller) v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union: Summary of the Judgment of the Divisional Court, 3 November 2016, p 1). 
11 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin).  
12 HL Hansard, 7 November 2016, col 934. For a summary of responses to the High Court judgment see: House of 
Lords Library, High Court Judgment on Article 50: Responses, 9 November 2016. 
13 Supreme Court, ‘Article 50 (‘Brexit’) Case’, 8 November 2016. 
14 Supreme Court, ‘Access to the Supreme Court Building: Article 50 (‘Brexit’) Case, 5–8 December 2016’, 
16 November 2016. On 18 November 2016, the Supreme Court confirmed that permission to intervene in the 
case had been granted to the following parties: the Lord Advocate, Scottish Government; the Counsel General for 
Wales, Welsh Government; the ‘Expat Interveners’, George Birnie and Others; and the Independent Workers 
Union of Great Britain. In addition, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland has made a reference to the Court 
regarding devolution issues (Supreme Court, R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for 
Exiting the European Union, 5–8 December 2016, 18 November 2016). For a discussion of the “difficult and delicate 
issues about the constitutional relationship between Government and Parliament” arising from the case see: 
Supreme Court, The Supreme Court: Guardian of the Constitution? Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture 2016, Kuala Lumpur, by 
Lady Hale, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, 9 November 2016. 
15 HL Hansard, 7 November 2016, col 931.  
16 Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Government Announces End of European Communities Act’, 
2 October 2016; and HL Hansard, 7 November 2016, col 931. 
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The Prime Minister, Theresa May, provided details of the intentions behind the ‘Great Repeal 
Bill’ during her speech to the Conservative Party conference delivered on 2 October 2016:  
 
This historic Bill—which will be included in the next Queen’s Speech—will mean that 
the 1972 Act, the legislation that gives direct effect to all EU law in Britain, will no 
longer apply from the date upon which we formally leave the European Union. And its 
effect will be clear. Our laws will be made not in Brussels but in Westminster. The 
judges interpreting those laws will sit not in Luxembourg but in courts in this country. 
The authority of EU law in Britain will end.  
 
As we repeal the European Communities Act, we will convert the ‘acquis’ [acquis 
communautaire]—that is, the body of existing EU law—into British law. When the 
Great Repeal Bill is given royal assent, Parliament will be free—subject to international 
agreements and treaties with other countries and the EU on matters such as trade—to 
amend, repeal and improve any law it chooses. But by converting the acquis into British 
law, we will give businesses and workers maximum certainty as we leave the European 
Union. The same rules and laws will apply to them after Brexit as they did before. Any 
changes in the law will have to be subject to full scrutiny and proper parliamentary 
debate.17 
 
The House of Lords European Union Committee has commented on a number of issues which, 
it said, arise from the Government’s undertaking to introduce a ‘Great Repeal Bill’. In its Brexit: 
Parliamentary Scrutiny report published on 20 October 2016, the Committee contended that 
directly consequential amendments to primary legislation will have to come into effect 
simultaneously, “including to the Acts enshrining EU law within the devolved settlements”.18  
 
The Committee also commented on the Prime Minister’s undertaking that the ‘Great Repeal 
Bill’ would convert the acquis—the existing body of EU law—into UK law at the same time as 
repealing the ECA. The Committee assumed that there would be a saving provision, “to ensure 
that the many thousands of pieces of subordinate legislation made under the 1972 Act are 
retained, pending further review”, and gave its view that all of this subordinate legislation would 
need to be updated to make reference to the appropriate domestic institutions.19 The 
Committee concluded that it welcomed the Government’s aim of “maintaining the body of 
existing EU law in force, pending review”, but noted that “giving effect to this aim may be more 
complex than the Government has yet acknowledged”.20  
 
The Committee further commented on the Prime Minister’s referral in her conference speech 
to the review of the acquis that would follow withdrawal, after it had been transposed into UK 
law. The Committee noted evidence given by the Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, David Davis, that the Government was, in his words, “trying to avoid” a Bill with wide-
ranging ‘Henry VIII clauses’. The inclusion of such clauses, the Committee added, would have 
the effect of curtailing parliamentary scrutiny. It also noted that “many commentators have 
highlighted the complexity of the task of reviewing more than 40 years of EU law”, citing the 
former Treasury Solicitor Sir Paul Jenkins’ characterisation of the process as the “largest legal, 
                                            
17 Conservative Party, ‘Prime Minister: Britain after Brexit—A Vision of a Global Britain’, 2 October 2016. 
18 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Parliamentary Scrutiny, 20 October 2016, HL Paper 50 of 
session 2016–17, p 24. The House debated the Committee’s report on 22 November 2016: HL Hansard, 
22 November 2016, cols 1851–905. 
19 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Parliamentary Scrutiny, 20 October 2016, HL Paper 50 of 
session 2016–17, p 24. 
20 ibid, p 25. 
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legislative and bureaucratic project in British history except for a world war”.21 The Committee 
concluded that the Government “has yet to set out its strategy for conducting a full review of 
EU law post-withdrawal”. Given the likely scale of the task, the Committee concluded:  
 
While we welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment to full parliamentary scrutiny, we 
note that the legislation resulting from the review will have a profound impact upon 
Parliament, potentially dominating the domestic legislative agenda for an extended 
period. We therefore recommend that the Government publish an outline strategy for 
the post-withdrawal review of EU law as soon as possible, in order to inform 
consideration by the two Houses of how to deliver an appropriate and manageable level 
of parliamentary scrutiny.22 
 
It is currently unclear whether domestic law will continue to be updated in line with any 
changes made by the EU following the transposition of EU law into UK law.23  
 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
It is unclear whether UK courts will continue to rely on the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union when interpreting EU law after it has been transposed into UK 
law.24  
 
The House of Lords European Union Committee commented on this issue in its report Brexit: 
Parliamentary Scrutiny, published on 20 October 2016. In the report, the Committee stated that 
the Prime Minister’s commitment to convert the acquis into domestic law “will raise still more 
complex issues, when it comes to giving effect in domestic law both to obligations currently 
arising from directly applicable EU law, and to judgments of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union interpreting that law”.25  
 
A report by the UK in a Changing Europe Initiative, an Economic and Social Research Council-
funded non-partisan research centre, for the Political Studies Association, has also commented 
on this issue. The report stated that the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would:  
 
[…] have to say something about the fate of decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in Luxembourg. Given the arguments about ‘control’ that dominated the 
referendum campaign, there will be strong opposition to the ECJ continuing to have a 
long term role of direct influence on UK jurisprudence. However, given the extent of 
the task of unpicking existing EU-influenced law, the UK courts are likely to continue to 
have regard to the rulings of the ECJ, as its decisions have influenced many areas of 
English case law. So for an interim period interpretation of EU law will play some role in 
English jurisprudence.26 
 
                                            
21 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Parliamentary Scrutiny, 20 October 2016, HL Paper 50 of 
session 2016–17, p 25. 
22 ibid, pp 25–6. 
23 House of Commons Library, Brexit: Some Legal, Constitutional and Financial Unknowns, 9 November 2016, p 7. The 
House of Commons Library has published an extensive briefing on the subject: Legislating for Brexit: The Great 
Repeal Bill, 21 November 2016. 
24 House of Commons Library, Brexit: Some Legal, Constitutional and Financial Unknowns, 9 November 2016, p 7. 
25 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Parliamentary Scrutiny, 20 October 2016, HL Paper 50 of 
session 2016–17, p 24.  
26 UK in a Changing Europe Initiative, Brexit and Beyond: How the United Kingdom Might Leave the European Union, 
November 2016, p 13. 
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The report posited that any new deal between the UK and the EU would require a position on 
the extent to which the UK continued to apply the EU’s rules and regulations, including all 
primary and secondary legal instruments and case law of the Court of Justice.27  
 
The report outlined four basic options that the UK and EU could take with respect to “any 
given block of acquis during their negotiations”. These were set out as follows:  
 
 Full and On-Going Legal Compliance 
As a member state, the UK is obliged to implement and enforce EU legislation 
and decisions. Outside the EU, it might be decided that it continues to do this, 
committing within the final agreement on the new relationship to continue 
implementing certain areas of the EU’s work. This would imply that Parliament 
would continue to transpose relevant EU legislation into domestic law, and that 
British courts would continue to ensure that UK citizens could rely on relevant 
provisions in any cases they might bring […] 
 
 Effective, but Non-Legal Compliance 
Rather than making a full commitment to ongoing implementation, the UK could 
instead make an informal statement to the effect that it chooses freely to adapt 
its legislation in line with the changing EU system. Again this would require 
Parliament to make the necessary legal changes, but courts would only be bound 
by domestic law, rather than any international instrument […] 
 
 Parallel Compliance 
Several areas of EU activity do, in effect, insert another layer of governance 
between the national and international. In fields such as public health, the EU is 
little more than a conduit for World Health Organisation (WHO) decisions, for 
example. While the UK might be leaving the former, it is not planning to leave 
the latter, so any commitment to WHO rules would, in effect, mean compliance 
with EU rules, since these are the same […] 
 
 Explicit Non-Compliance 
Finally, the UK might decide to take itself out of a set of the acquis and introduce 
its own rules and regulations. As a sovereign state, it would be well within its 
rights so to do, assuming it met its other international obligations, and there is 
no a priori need for the UK to accept any particular area of the acquis once it 
leaves.28  
 
Richard Gordon QC has written on the legal status of EU law following the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU and the common law implications of withdrawal.29 In an article published in the 
October 2016 issue of Butterworth’s Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, Mr Gordon 
made the following key points:  
 
Post-Brexit, there will no longer be a CJEU [Court of Justice of the European 
Union] to defer to or whose rulings continue to bind domestic courts.  
                                            
27 UK in a Changing Europe Initiative, Brexit and Beyond: How the United Kingdom Might Leave the European Union, 
November 2016, p 14.  
28 ibid, pp 14–15. 
29 Richard Gordon QC, ‘The UK Courts After Brexit’, Butterworth’s Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 
October 2016, pp 511–13. 
6 House of Lords Library Note   I   Future UK-EU Relationship 
 
 Unless Parliament were to prescribe for a doctrine of direct effect/applicability in 
relation to the ‘EU law’ that it preserved after Brexit a court would have to 
imply such a doctrine into its canons of interpretation alongside all the other 
general principles of EU law that render it distinct from domestic law. 
 
 The only way in which true EU law might be given effect to by the courts despite 
ostensibly contrary domestic law provision is if future domestic rulings were to 
hold that the common law itself had developed since our accession to the EU.30 
 
The House of Lords European Union Committee also touched on this issue. The Committee 
noted that the domestic courts would “face the challenge of interpreting subordinate legislation 
that originally implemented EU directives, once those directives have ceased to apply in the 
UK”.31  
 
On 21 November 2016, it was reported that Koen Lenaerts, President of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, had stated that there were “many, many ways” the UK’s departure 
from the EU could end up before the European Court of Justice, although he declined to 
comment on the specifics at this stage.32  
 
Devolved Administrations 
 
The UK in a Changing Europe Initiative also identified an issue regarding law making and 
devolution in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union:  
 
There is a particularly acute devolution dimension to the return of legal powers to the 
UK from the EU. If nothing else is done, a range of competences currently shared 
between the devolved legislatures and the EU will revert to the former, unless 
Westminster legislates to take them back to itself. These include agriculture, some of 
fisheries, environment and higher education and research. Any effort to bring them back 
to Westminster would meet strong political objections. If they are left to the devolved 
administrations, there would be a need for coordination mechanisms within the UK and 
provisions to maintain the single UK market.33 
 
The Initiative also stated that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU “may lead to a recentralisation 
as the UK reconstitutes itself as a sovereign polity”, or to “further decentralisation with the 
devolution of EU competencies”. In either case, the authors asserted that the “process will be 
difficult and controversial”.34  
 
Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called for a constitutional convention to “consider 
the repatriation of powers from Brussels not to Whitehall or Westminster but to the regions 
                                            
30 Richard Gordon QC, ‘The UK Courts After Brexit’, Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 
October 2016, p 511. For further information see: Richard Gordon QC and Rowena Moffatt, Brexit: The Immediate 
Legal Consequences, May 2016. 
31 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Parliamentary Scrutiny, 20 October 2016, HL Paper 50 of 
session 2016–17, p 24. 
32 Duncan Robinson and Alex Barker, ‘‘Many Ways’ Brexit May Go to EU Courts, Top ECJ Judge Says’, Financial 
Times, 21 November 2016. 
33 UK in a Changing Europe Initiative, Brexit and Beyond: How the United Kingdom Might Leave the European Union, 
November 2016, p 13. 
34 ibid, p 22. 
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and nations of the United Kingdom”.35 Mr Brown added: “Specifically, we should devolve 
powers over regional policy, agriculture, fisheries and social funds to the Scottish Parliament, 
the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies, the new City Mayors and local authorities”. A 
constitutional convention was proposed as an idea following the outcome of the Scottish 
referendum on independence in 2014. The House of Lords Library briefing Constitutional 
Conventions: Possible Options in the New Parliament discusses possible forms a constitutional 
convention can take.36  
 
2. Immigration 
 
2.1 Current Situation 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht first introduced the prospect that EU citizenship could be enjoyed 
automatically by every national of a member state. In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty confirmed the 
right of free movement in EU member states under its general provisions on Freedom, Security 
and Justice. Presently, provisions governing the free movement of people are laid down in 
Directive 2004/38/EC concerning the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely in member 
states. This includes: spouses or registered partners; direct descendants under the age of 21 or 
dependants of the spouse or registered partners; dependent direct relatives in the ascending 
line; and those of the spouse or registered partner.37 
 
Currently, rights and obligations vary depending on the length of stay. For stays under three 
months, EU citizens are required to possess a valid passport or identification document. For 
stays over three months, EU citizens and their family (if unemployed) must have sufficient 
resources and sickness insurance to ensure that they are not “a burden” on the state. For EU 
citizens seeking permanent residency in another member state, they must have a five-year 
period of uninterrupted legal residence, on the provision that an expulsion decision has not 
been enforced against them.38 
 
According to the latest net migration statistics for the year ending March 2016, net migration 
to the UK was 327,000. Of that figure, 268,000 EU citizens immigrated to the UK, whilst 
89,000 emigrated from the UK, resulting in an EU net migration total of 179,000.39 In contrast, 
the latest statistics reveal that 282,000 non-EU citizens immigrated to the UK, whilst 92,000 
non-EU citizens emigrated, resulting in a non-EU net migration total of 190,000.40 In addition, 
the international passenger survey projects that approximately 469,000 British citizens have 
immigrated to the EU countries in the period 2005–14.41  
 
  
                                            
35 Office of Gordon and Sarah Brown, ‘Gordon Brown Proposes UK People’s Constitutional Convention’, 
3 November 2016. 
36 House of Lords Library, Constitutional Conventions: Possible Options in the New Parliament, 20 March 2015. 
37 European Parliament, ‘Free Movement of Persons’, accessed 18 November 2016. 
38 ibid. 
39 Office for National Statistics, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: August 2016’, 25 August 2016. 
40 ibid. 
41 Office for National Statistics, ‘Long-Term International Migration. Inflow of EU Citizens to the UK and Outflow 
of British Citizens to the EU: 2005 to 2014’, 26 May 2016. It should be noted that migration statistics are based on 
international passenger survey data and as a result are contested by some, with other sources giving different 
estimates of EU nations in the UK. 
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Figure 1 below sets out immigration to the UK by citizenship between 2006 to the year ending 
March 2016. 
 
Figure 1: Immigration to the UK by Citizenship (Thousands) 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: August 2016’, 
25 August 2016 
 
Further, the organisation Full Fact report that there were approximately 1.2 million UK-born 
residents in the EU in 2015. It also notes that there were approximately 3 million EU-born 
residents in the UK in 2014.42 
 
2.2 Issues 
 
The result of the referendum on the UK’s membership has a number of potential implications, 
particularly on immigration to and from the UK. This includes whether the UK will maintain 
free movement of people in any future agreement with the EU. Other possible implications are 
dependent on the model that the UK adopts on leaving the EU. This section will examine the 
potential impact of the UK leaving the EU on UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK. 
 
At present, the UK remains an EU member state and therefore continues to exercise the free 
movement of people, although this is set to be one of the key issues for the Government to 
resolve during negotiations for the UK’s withdrawal of the EU. On 11 July 2016, a Cabinet 
Office press release outlined the Government’s initial position on people that have already 
moved, stating: 
 
When we do leave the EU, we fully expect that the legal status of EU nationals living in 
the UK, and that of UK nationals in EU member states, will be properly protected. The 
Government recognises and values the important contribution made by EU and other 
non-UK citizens who work, study and live in the UK.43  
 
                                            
42 Full Fact, 'Brits Abroad: How Many People from the UK Live In Other EU Countries?', updated 29 March 2016.   
43 Cabinet Office, ‘Statement: The Status of EU Nationals in the UK’, 11 July 2016. 
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In relation to the ongoing free movement of people, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
addressed the issue following the decision to vote to leave the UK. In a statement, he said: 
 
I would also reassure Brits living in European countries, and European citizens living 
here, that there will be no immediate changes in your circumstances. There will be no 
initial change in the way our people can travel, in the way our goods can move or the 
way our services can be sold.44  
 
On 12 October 2016, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, told 
the House of Commons that the decision to leave the EU meant the Government would: 
 
Decide on our borders, our laws and the taxpayer’s money. It means getting the best 
deal for Britain: one that is unique to Britain and not an off-the-shelf solution. This must 
mean controls on the numbers of people who come to Britain from Europe […] We 
can create an immigration system that allows us to control numbers and encourage the 
brightest and best to come to this country.45  
 
Norwegian Model 
 
Prior to the referendum, the Government published a report outlining alternative models to 
EU membership.46 This includes the Norway model, which has membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and has chosen to be part of the Schengen Area. As a result, the country 
remains outside the EU but accepts the free movement of people.47 This means that Norway 
applies policies agreed between Schengen countries on visas and external border control, with 
Norway and other member states in the Schengen area having no internal passport controls 
between them.48 
 
The Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, has previously indicated that he would like to 
see the UK adopting a similar model to that of Norway. In a speech at Bloomberg in September 
2016, Mr Corbyn stated that his party were:  
 
Looking very closely at the Norwegian model […] not using their model, it’s learning 
the lessons from Norway. Maybe we can learn a lot from Norway.49  
 
Mark Stanford, a Teaching Fellow at King’s College London, has argued that the Norway model 
was the UK’s “best hope for maintaining a United Kingdom”, with continued free movement of 
people ensuring that the Common Travel Area (CTA) could continue to exist without border 
checkpoints.50 The CTA is an open borders travel zone between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom—including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man—and has been in operation since 
the 1920s.51 Mr Stanford also warned that now that the UK has voted to leave the EU, the 
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Government had the “chance to articulate a new vision for Britain’s role in the world”, 
however, “the EEA must be central to this vision”.52              
 
Bilateral Agreements: Swiss Model     
 
Another model that the UK could potentially adopt is the Swiss model, which has a relationship 
with the EU based on a series of bilateral agreements. Unlike Norway, the Swiss electorate 
voted against EEA membership, resulting in the country having no access to the single market. 
However, Switzerland does have similar arrangements to Norway on border control and chose 
to join the Schengen Area in 2008. Despite the agreement between Switzerland and the EU, the 
UK Government noted in March 2016 that both parties are “currently in dispute over the 
terms of their relationship”, in particular, over the issue of migration.53 This is due to the Swiss 
electorate voting for the introduction of quotas on immigration in a nationwide referendum in 
2014, something the EU contended was “a breach of the EU-Switzerland bilateral agreements, 
which contain a requirement for free movement of people”.54 As a result of the perceived 
breach, the EU reduced Switzerland’s access to EU educational programmes and research 
funding, and should it introduce migration quotas, could remove Switzerland’s access to the EU 
single market.     
 
Writing before the referendum, Dr Sabine Jenni, an Associate Researcher at the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zurich, said the Swiss model was “not a solution the UK can adopt 
off the shelf if it votes to leave the EU”.55 She contended that as a result of ad-hoc negotiations 
that shaped the Swiss model, it took Switzerland six years to negotiate the first package of 
sectoral agreements after the Swiss electorate had rejected the agreement on the EEA in 1992. 
Dr Jenni also stated that were the UK to adopt the Swiss model, it would need to accept EU 
package deals as part of the European integration process.56 
 
EEA Minus Model 
 
Another potential model is the EEA minus option, discussed by Jonathan Portes, an Associate 
Fellow at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The concept of the EEA 
minus model is that the UK joins the EEA, whilst retaining some control over immigration. 
Under the model, there would be limits to the number of EEA nationals who could legally work 
in the UK. However, according to Mr Portes, the model would be difficult to implement. He 
has said that it was “likely that EEA nationals who have already exercised free movement rights 
will retain those in perpetuity”, meaning that there were “(conservatively) at least 1.5 million 
EEA nationals not currently resident in the UK who already have some connection with the UK 
labour market and who could therefore in future migrate to the UK without being subject to 
any quota”.57   
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Prospects for a Bespoke Model    
 
The Prime Minister, Theresa May, has dismissed the notion of following similar models to that 
of Norway and Switzerland. On 2 October 2016, she told delegates at the Conservative Party 
conference that:  
 
The process we are about to begin is not about negotiating all of our sovereignty away 
again. It is not going to be about any of those matters over which the country has just 
voted to regain control. It is not, therefore, a negotiation to establish a relationship 
anything like the one we have had for the last forty years or more. So it is not going to a 
“Norway model”. It’s not going to be a “Switzerland model”. It is going to be an 
agreement between an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the European 
Union.58 
 
Mrs May also said that she knew some people had asked “about the ‘trade-off’ between 
controlling immigration and trading with Europe”. In response, she stated: “we will do what 
independent, sovereign countries do. We will decide for ourselves how we control 
immigration. And we will be free to pass our own laws”.59   
 
However, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has previously stated that the EU would not 
divide its four freedoms in order to allow Britain to possibly restrict immigration and retain 
access to the single market. In a speech to the German employers’ association, the 
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA), Mrs Merkel said:  
 
Were we to make an exception for the free movement of people with Britain, this 
would mean we would endanger principles of the whole internal market in the 
European Union, because everyone else will then want these exceptions.60 
 
On 17 October 2016, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Jose Manuel Garcia-
Margallo, told EU foreign ministers at a meeting in Luxembourg that he thought the UK’s 
withdrawal agreement with the EU would most likely resemble the one between the EU and 
Canada, known as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. He stated: 
 
Forget the Norwegian model, forget the Swiss model because of the condition for the 
freedom of movement of people, and forget a Turkish-style customs union […] If the 
British insist on having the option to restrain the free movement of European workers 
to the United Kingdom, the only solution is the Canadian one.61 
 
On 25 October 2016, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Hammond, answered an oral 
question in the House of Commons regarding financial services based in the UK and their 
requirement to access the single market and employ EU workers. He suggested that highly-
skilled financial workers may not be subject to any future EU migration controls, stating:  
 
I have certainly sought to reassure financial services businesses that we will put their 
needs at the heart of our negotiation with the European Union. We understand their 
need for market access. We also understand their need to be able to engage the right 
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skilled people […] I see no likelihood of our using powers to control migration into the 
UK to prevent companies from bringing highly skilled, highly paid workers here.62        
 
Potential Impact on UK Citizens in the EU and EU Citizens in the UK 
 
On 10 October 2016, David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, made a 
statement to the House of Commons regarding the next steps for leaving the EU. In response 
to a question regarding the potential impact on UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the 
UK, Mr Davis stated that: 
 
In terms of European migrants here [in the UK], the intention of the Government is to 
do everything possible to underwrite and guarantee their position, at the same time as 
we underwrite the similar position of British migrants abroad. That is what we intend to 
do.63 
 
Later that day, Mr Davis’ view was echoed by the Prime Minister who said that she expected to 
guarantee the rights of EU citizens already living in the UK. Following a meeting in Copenhagen 
with the Danish Prime Minister, Lars-Lokke Rasmussen, Mrs May told the press that:  
 
I expect to be able to guarantee the legal rights of EU nationals already in the UK so 
long as the British nationals living in Europe receive—in the countries who are member 
states of the EU—the same treatment.64 
 
However, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Professor of Law at Queen Mary University of London, has 
said that if the UK’s future relationship with the EU was not based on an EEA model, there 
would be “real concern about the acquired rights of EU citizens in the UK”.65 She argued that 
she was “not sure” that there would “be a sufficient majority in Parliament to legislate and 
protect the rights of all EU citizens who were lawfully present in the UK on June 23”.66 
 
Prior to the referendum, the Migration Observatory reported that by early 2015, 
approximately 39 percent of citizens of EEA countries who had been living in the UK had 
remained in the country for ten years or more, with a further 32 percent having lived in the UK 
for five to nine years. As a result, a majority had been in the UK for long enough to qualify for 
permanent residency. However, it noted that “there remains some uncertainty” regarding how 
“the status of EU citizens who have been living in the UK for less than five years would be 
determined”.67 The Migration Observatory also stated that these questions could be clarified as 
part of the agreement between the UK and EU. 
 
  
                                            
62 HC Hansard, 25 October 2016, cols 132–4. 
63 HC Hansard, 10 October 2016, cols 40–69. 
64 Stephen Addison, ‘May says Expects to Guarantee Rights of EU Citizens in UK after Brexit’, Reuters, 10 October 
2016. 
65 Agnes Frimston, ‘Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, European Law Expert’, The World Today, August 2016. 
66 ibid. 
67 Migration Observatory, ‘What Would UK Immigration Policy Look Like After Brexit?’, 9 June 2016. 
House of Lords Library Note   I   Future UK-EU Relationship          13 
 
3. Security Cooperation 
 
3.1 Current Situation 
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
On 7 February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and established a European Union 
comprising three pillars: the European Communities; Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP); and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.68 The CFSP would provide a 
basis for the first time for both intergovernmental cooperation and common action among the 
European Union’s member states “on a range of foreign and security policy issues”.69 According 
to Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, the objectives of the EU’s foreign and security 
policy include safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union, preserving peace and strengthening international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and 
the objectives of the Paris Charter.70 
 
Although the Lisbon Treaty, which came into effect in 2009, abolished the EU’s pillar structure, 
Title V of the Treaty on European Union sets out the provisions on a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.71 The Lisbon Treaty also strengthened the CFSP with the creation of both the 
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS).  
 
An individual is appointed to the role of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy through a qualified majority vote by heads of state and government in the 
European Council. In addition to becoming the Vice President of the European Commission, 
the role of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is wide-ranging 
and includes overseeing foreign and security policy on behalf of the EU, representing the EU at 
international meetings, such as the United Nations, and heading the EEAS.72 The EEAS is the 
EU’s diplomatic service and aims to “make sure the voice of the European Union and its people 
are heard in the world”.73 This involves running 139 EU delegations and offices around the 
world, with their main role to “represent the EU in the country where they are based and to 
promote the values and interests of the EU”.74 
 
Another aspect of the CFSP is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In general, 
under both the CFSP and CSDP, decision-making is made by unanimity in the European 
Council, which comprises of member states’ government ministers.    
 
Common Security and Defence Policy 
 
The CSDP is part of the EU’s CFSP, covering its military operations and civilian missions. 
Framed by the Treaty on European Union, the CSDP provides the EU with the policy 
framework for a number of permanent political and military structures and for operations 
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abroad. This includes the “capacity to draw on member states’ civilian and military assets” for 
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security.75 In relation to 
operations and missions under CSDP, Article 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union states 
that the Union may use civilian and military means for joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks and peacekeeping tasks, amongst other tasks.76 
 
As of May 2016, the EU has six military operations/missions and eleven civilian missions taking 
place across Africa, Asia and Europe, as part of its CSDP. This includes missions in Afghanistan, 
Central African Republic and Ukraine.77 As of June 2016, the UK had approximately 120 service 
personnel deployed on five EU missions, principally on Operation SOPHIA, where HMS 
Enterprise is employed in the Mediterranean.78 
 
Police and Security Cooperation 
 
In addition to both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, the UK and EU also cooperate on justice and home affairs, particularly in 
relation to cross-border crimes and terrorism. To do so, the EU provides member states with 
a number of tools to exchange information and streamline extradition arrangements. In its 
background note on the UK’s Cooperation with the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, and on Foreign 
Policy and Security Issues, published prior to the referendum, the Government noted that it 
cooperated with the EU on a number of measures:  
 
 The European Arrest Warrant (EAW): a legal framework that “facilitates 
the extradition of individuals between EU Member states”, who are facing 
prosecution for a crime they are accused of committing, or to serve a prison 
sentence for an existing conviction.79 According to government figures, prior to 
2004, an average of 60 individuals a year were extradited from the UK. In 
contrast, since 2004, the UK has extradited over 7,000 individuals accused or 
convicted of a criminal offence to other member states. The Government also 
reported that over the same period, the EAW had been used to extradite over 
1,000 individuals to the UK to face justice.80     
 
 Europol: an EU agency that supports law enforcement. Europol aids UK law 
enforcement authorities by supporting their investigations, processing data and 
accessing law enforcement intelligence from the other 27 Member states. The 
Government reported that as of January 2016, the Europol Information 
System—which pools information on criminals and terrorists from across the 
EU—contained data on 86,629 suspected or convicted criminals from across the 
EU. They also noted that the UK uses Europol “almost more than any other 
country”, whilst UK law enforcement’s use of the agency has “increased over 
                                            
75 HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competencies between the United Kingdom and the European Union: 
Foreign Policy, 22 July 2013, p 20. 
76 EUR-Lex, ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’, accessed 18 November 2016. 
77 European Union External Action Service, ‘Military and Civilian Missions and Operations’, 3 May 2016. 
78 House of Commons, ‘Written Question: Armed Forces: Deployment’, 6 June 2016, 38800. 
79 HM Government, The UK’s Cooperation with the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, and on Foreign Policy and Security 
Issues, 9 May 2016, p 2. 
80 ibid, p 3. 
House of Lords Library Note   I   Future UK-EU Relationship          15 
 
time”, exchanging 26 percent more messages on Europol’s Secure Information 
Exchange Network Application in 2015 than in 2014.81    
 
 Another information system that the UK uses in combatting cross-border crime 
is Passenger Name Records (PNR). The PNR system contains information 
collated by the carrier as part of a travel booking process and details for whom 
and how the booking was made, contact details and travel itinerary. In April 
2016, the EU adopted legislation on flights to and from Europe, which the 
Government argued will help all member states identify “terrorist patterns of 
travel to and from conflict zones”, such as Syria.82 
 
 Prüm: a mechanism that allows members states to search DNA and fingerprint 
profiles against other member states’ DNA and fingerprint databases on a “hit/no 
hit basis”.83 In December 2015, Parliament voted to re-join Prüm’s legal 
framework on the recommendation of the Government, in relation to both 
fingerprint and DNA exchange, in addition to vehicle registration data. Before 
the recommendation, the Government conducted a pilot, exchanging DNA 
profiles with four other member states. This resulted in the UK obtaining 
118 matches from approximately 2,500 DNA profiles, covering offences such as 
burglary and sexual assault.         
 
 Since April 2015, the UK has also connected to the Second Generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II), which is a database providing ‘real-
time’ alerts about individuals and objects of interest to EU law enforcement 
agencies. It contains information on 35,000 people wanted on an EAW, as well as 
alerts on suspected foreign fighters and missing people. Between 1 April 2015 
and 31 March 2016, the Government note that 6,400 foreign alerts received hits 
in the UK, whilst over 6,600 alerts issued by law enforcement officials in the UK 
received hits in Europe.84 
 
3.2 Issues 
 
Following the outcome of the UK referendum, there has been increased speculation as to the 
implications that leaving the EU could have on the UK’s security relationship with the EU. For 
some this includes an impact on the UK’s ability in future to use a number of EU security tools. 
In contrast, others have suggested that there will be little impact on the future workings of the 
UK and EU on security and as in the case of European Arrest Warrant, the UK would attempt 
to negotiate a deal which involved keeping many of the existing aforementioned EU security 
measures. There are also possibilities that the UK leaving the EU will impact the EU’s 
relationship with NATO and could lead to the potential establishment of a joint military force 
in the EU. This section examines some of these perspectives. 
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Future of the CFSP and CSDP 
 
On July 2016, the Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Michael Fallon, told the House of 
Commons Defence Committee that there was “no reason” why the UK voting to leaving the 
EU:  
 
[…] should inhibit our cooperation bilaterally with our key allies in Europe—the 
northern group, the EU members that are members of the Joint Expeditionary Force, or 
the key alliances with France and Germany. There is no reason why it should inhibit 
future cooperation with missions that are in our direct interest.85 
 
This view was echoed by the Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, who told delegates at the 
Conservative Party conference that the Government would “remain committed to all kinds of 
European cooperation—at an intergovernmental level”, for example, sanctions against Russia 
for the situation in Ukraine or sending the navy to help deal with the migrant crisis in the 
Mediterranean Sea.86 However, in evidence to the Defence Committee, Sir Michael Fallon 
stated that he was not going to “speculate now on whether we [the UK] are going to join 
particular CSDP missions”.87   
 
As a result, some commentators have raised the prospect of the UK adopting similar models to 
those of Norway and Switzerland, who are not members of the EU but cooperate with the EU 
on security. Under the Norway model, as a result of the country’s decision not to join the EU, 
it does not decide EU international and security policy. However, it can align its position with 
that of EU member states and as a result, can participate in sanctions against countries outside 
of the EU, such as Iran and Russia. In March 2016, the Government noted that Norway has 
participated voluntarily in more than 90 percent of EU sanctions, in addition to sending military 
personnel on EU defence missions.88  
 
Similar to Norway, Switzerland has no influence in determining EU international and security 
policy. It has also aligned itself with positions taken by the EU, including sanctions and has sent 
personnel to EU civilian and military missions.89 According to the think tank the Centre for 
European Reform (CER), as a non-member, the UK would still have the opportunity to second 
personnel to EU CDSP missions, as many other non-member states such as Norway and 
Switzerland do.90 In order to do so, the UK would need to sign a framework participation 
agreement with the EU, which would still ensure that the EU retained decision-making 
autonomy. This, the CER stated, would reduce the UK’s ability to influence missions at the 
planning stage.91 Ian Bond, Director of Foreign Policy and Defence at the CER, has observed 
that “as countries like Norway or Canada could testify, even third countries with very similar 
values and perspectives to those of EU members have to work very hard to have any impact on 
EU policy”. 92 In this scenario, the Foreign Secretary would no longer attend meetings at the 
Foreign Affairs Council after the UK withdrew from the EU. Hylke Dijkstra, Professor of 
                                            
85 House of Commons Defence Committee, Oral Evidence: Warsaw, NATO Summit and Chilcot Report, 19 July 2016, 
HC 579 of session 2016–17, Q 23. 
86 Conservative Party, ‘Johnson: How British Values Help to Make the World Richer and Safer’, 2 October 2016. 
87 House of Commons Defence Committee, Oral Evidence: Warsaw, NATO Summit and Chilcot Report, 19 July 2016, 
HC 579 of session 2016-17, Q 22. 
88 HM Government, Alternatives to Membership: Possible Models for the United Kingdom Outside the European Union,           
2 March 2016, p 18. 
89 ibid, p 27. 
90 Centre for European Reform, Europe After Brexit: Unleashed or Undone?, April 2016. 
91 ibid. 
92 Ian Bond, ‘Brexit and Foreign Policy: Divorce?’, Centre for European Reform, 18 July 2016. 
House of Lords Library Note   I   Future UK-EU Relationship          17 
 
Political Science at Maastricht University, noted that “it would be strange if the UK, as a major 
diplomatic actor, were meekly to align itself post hoc with EU positions that had been debated 
and agreed in its absence”.93 As a result, Dr Dijkstra called on the EU to discuss the “opening 
up” of the EU Foreign Affairs Council so that non-member states would have the opportunity 
to discuss foreign policy with representatives of the EU.94 
 
Establishment of a Common EU Military Force 
 
A number of commentators have suggested that the UK’s departure from the EU could raise 
the possibility of the EU creating a common military force and permanent operational 
headquarters. In 2015, the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, called for the 
creation of a European army, in order to “help us [the EU] design a common foreign and 
security policy”.95 He also stated that such an army would “enable Europeans to react credibly 
to any threat to peace in a country abutting on a member state of the EU”.96  
 
However, the Government has continued to oppose the idea, with Sir Michael Fallon previously 
stating that the UK would continue to veto plans for an EU army as long as it was in the EU 
because the UK believed it would undermine NATO.97 On 16 September 2016, EU heads of 
state, with the exception of the UK, held a summit in Bratislava to discuss the EU’s future, 
particularly in terms of foreign policy and security. In a joint declaration, they agreed that in 
order to “strengthen EU cooperation on external security and defence”, they would use the 
European Council meeting in December to “decide on a concrete implementation plan on 
security and defence”.98 According to press who were covering the summit, this included 
French and German heads of state drawing up a timetable to create a common military force.99 
 
The UK’s stance has led to some commentators believing that the UK’s departure from the EU 
may mean that there is less opposition from within the EU towards the establishment of a joint 
military force. According to the think tank the Centre for European Policy Studies once the UK 
leaves, “there is also likely to be less opposition to the establishment of permanent structured 
cooperation, or to the setting-up of EU military headquarters”.100 Professor Anand Menon, has 
observed that, without the UK, the EU “might find ways to work better” in responding to 
security crises. He contended that without the UK, “one could imagine the remaining members 
establishing the operational headquarters that they have long lobbied for and which Britain has 
systematically blocked”.101 
 
Future Relationship between the EU and NATO 
 
In July 2016, Sir Michael Fallon told the House of Commons Defence Committee that: 
 
On our own position now, cooperation with the European Union will remain important 
to our shared security interests. Those interests have not changed, and we also have a 
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continuing interest—perhaps even more of an interest—in a closer relationship 
between NATO and the European Union, which is reflected in the communiqué. It has 
been a long-standing British preoccupation that these two organisations should work 
better together, should avoid duplicating each other wherever possible and should 
complement each other’s strengths.102 
 
Sir Michael also told the Committee that “there are a number of interlocking missions in 
Europe” between the EU and NATO, highlighting the fight to prevent the smuggling of people 
across the Mediterranean Sea as an example.103  
 
Writing in Foreign Affairs, Frank J Cillufo and Sharon L Cardash warned that once the UK leaves 
the EU, “the potential for divergence between the two entities [EU and NATO] could be 
magnified”, with the UK having “long-served as a touchstone for the United States in its dealing 
with Europe”.104 They also noted that both entities “would be well served to think carefully 
through some of the critical strategic and tactical questions that will have to be addressed”, 
with Europe’s “fracturing” previously leading to Russia “testing the continental and transatlantic 
alliance by bringing difficult and potentially divisive issues to the fore”.105  
 
In addition, concerns within the US have been raised regarding EU member states’ spending on 
NATO. Alongside the US, only four other members of both NATO and the EU (the UK, 
Estonia, Greece and Poland) meet the minimum contribution threshold of 2 percent of GDP.106 
Following a meeting with Theresa May in Downing Street, Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General 
of NATO, stated that more EU countries needed to follow the UK’s example by spending at 
least 2 percent of their GDP on defence. In addition, he said that this was “important for the 
transatlantic bond, for fair burden-sharing between Europe and the United States”.107  
 
Writing in International Affairs, Tom Oliver and Michael John Williams have argued that “long-
running US unease at low levels of European defence spending” had “reached a point where US 
willingness to commit to Europe’s security has been thrown into doubt”, subsequently, “this 
has raised concerns about the viability of NATO”.108 In addition, US President-elect Donald 
Trump has previously described NATO as obsolete, with questions remaining as to its future.109 
Jed Babbin, who previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defence in George H W 
Bush’s administration, warned that President-elect Trump “may not get the chance [to abandon 
NATO] because the EU may beat him to it”, with their plans to establish a joint military force 
and permanent headquarters.110  
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However, former US Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, contended that the UK 
outside the EU, alongside a Trump-led US, “can restore NATO and the West”.111 Writing in 
the Telegraph, Mr Bolton argued that a UK independent from the EU could “now be more 
effective with NATO’s central and eastern European members by not having to temper its 
security posture to suit Berlin and Paris”.112           
 
Future of Police and Security Cooperation between the UK and EU 
 
Some commentators have argued that after leaving the EU, the UK could be impaired in 
tackling cross-border crimes. In contrast, others contend that despite the UK’s exit, British law 
enforcement agencies will still be able to utilise some security tools and continue cooperating 
with external agencies.   
   
Prior to the referendum, the Government, under David Cameron, noted that should the UK 
leave the EU, it “would not have the same access to these tools outside the EU as we do 
now”.113 Benoit Gomis, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, warned that leaving the EU 
would “impair Britain’s ability to tackle terrorism and organised crime”.114 He stated that 
international security required a coordinated response, and that leaving the EU would mean 
that a number of new bilateral agreements with the EU’s institutions and its member states 
would need to be “negotiated and implemented at a time when relevant authorities are already 
under heavy strain”.115 Rob Wainwright, the Director of Europol, thought that it would be a 
“serious miscalculation” for the UK to leave the EU and withdraw from security cooperation 
with other member states.116 He noted that through membership of Europol, there was a “far 
stronger capability to fight crime” and that police “see the benefits every day” of working with 
Europol, for example, by being able to access intelligence databases.117 Mr Wainwright’s view 
was supported by Sir John Sawers, former Chief of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 
who called on the UK to remain in the EU. Writing in the Telegraph before the referendum, Sir 
John argued that:  
 
We must defend ourselves against terrorists. Terror networks operate across borders, 
and so must we if we are to stop them. The EU provides a valuable legal framework for 
sharing information and data—crucial tools in the modern era.118 
 
This view was dismissed by another former MI6 Chief, Sir Richard Dearlove, who contended 
that leaving the EU would not damage UK security. Writing for Prospect, Sir Richard stated that 
“whether one is an enthusiastic European or not, the truth about Brexit from a national 
security perspective is that the cost to Britain would be low”.119 He also argued that “the 
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crucial practical business of counter-terrorism and counter-espionage is conducted, even in 
Europe, through bilateral and very occasionally trilateral relationships”.120  
 
In September 2016, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European, David Davis, told the 
House of Commons that the Government was assessing “the whole justice and home affairs 
stream”, with the UK looking to “preserve the relationship with the European Union on 
security matters as best we can”. He also told the House that the Government was looking to 
maintain a number of measures, including the European Arrest Warrant.121 Furthermore, in 
response to being asked a number of parliamentary questions by Diana Johnson (Labour MP for 
Hull North) about the Government’s plans to maintain a number of EU intelligence sharing 
tools, such as Europol, Brandon Lewis, Minister of State for Policing at the Home Office, 
responded that: 
 
We are leaving the EU but cooperation on security with our European and global allies 
will be maintained. We will do what is necessary to keep our people safe—our aim will 
be to continue cooperation where it is in the national interest to protect the public. We 
are about to begin these negotiations and it would be wrong to set out unilateral 
positions in advance.122 
 
In her speech to delegates at the Conservative Party conference in October 2016, the Home 
Secretary, Amber Rudd, stated that following the terror attack in Nice in July 2016, “the one 
clear lesson from this is that international cooperation and intelligence sharing must continue, 
and continue to improve”.123 
 
Giving evidence to the House of Lords European Union Committee in regards to the future of 
UK-EU security cooperation once the UK withdraws from the EU, David Jones, Minister of 
State at the Department for Exiting the European Union, stated that the UK “will be entering 
into new bilateral agreements” or “at least we will hope to”.124 He alluded to the US’ 
relationship with the EU on security, with the US having a “high degree of cooperation with the 
EU”, despite not submitting to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
 
Giving evidence to the Committee, Alison Saunders, the Director of Public Prosecutions at the 
Crown Prosecution Service, stated that future security cooperation and access to specific 
information databases could be done on either an EU-wide or bilateral agreement. However, 
she did contend that it would be “easier to negotiate with a body and to have an agreement 
that covers all 27 [member states] rather than 27 bilateral agreements”.125 
 
On 14 November 2016, the Home Office announced that it would be remaining a full member 
of Europol until the UK’s formal exit from the EU.126 According to Brandon Lewis, Minister for 
Policing at the Home Office: 
 
The UK is leaving the EU but the reality of cross-border crime remains […] Europol 
provides a valuable service to the UK and opting in would enable us to maintain our 
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current access to that agency, until we leave the EU, helping keep the people of Britain 
safe. We now await the outcome of the scrutiny process.127 
 
The decision by the Home Office will now be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Once an 
assessment has been made, the European Commission will be notified of the Government’s 
decision. 
 
4. Trade 
 
4.1 Current Situation 
 
The UK, as a member of the EU, is currently within the European single market.128 The ‘four 
freedoms’ of the single market are facilitating the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital amongst member states. The UK is also a member of the EU customs union, which 
establishes a single external customs tariff for the EU and the abolition of duties between 
member states.129 The UK is party, by virtue of its membership of the EU, to the trade 
agreements which the EU has signed with non-EU countries.130  
 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, while the UK remains a member state within the customs union, 
the EU has exclusive competence regarding what is referred to as the ‘common commercial 
policy’.131 This means that, until it has left the EU, the UK is unable to sign trade deals with 
countries outside the EU which might include elements such as setting trade tariffs. However, 
the Government has said that it has begun preliminary, explorative talks with other countries 
ahead of triggering Article 50 which will signal the start of formal negotiations for the UK’s 
departure from the EU.132 
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Statistics 
 
In 2015, the UK exported goods and services worth £508.8 billion, and imported a total of 
£547.4 billion.133 The UK had a trade deficit of £38.7 billion.  
 
Total trade can be broken down into goods and services. In 2015, the UK had a total trade 
deficit in goods and a trade surplus in services. UK exports of goods totalled £283.3 billion and 
imports of goods totalled £409.7 billion, leaving a deficit of trade in goods of £126.4 billion.134 In 
contrast, UK exports of services totalled £225.5 billion and imports of services totalled 
£137.7 billion, giving a surplus of £87.8 billion. These figures are set out in the table below:  
 
UK Trade, 2015: Goods and Services 
 Exports (£ billion) Imports (£ billion) Balance (£ billion) 
Goods 283.3 409.7 -126.4 
Services 225.5 137.7 +87.8 
Total 508.8 547.4 -38.7 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Balance of Payments—April to June 2016, 
30 September 2016, Table B. Figures have been rounded and may not sum. 
 
The European Union is the UK’s largest trading partner.135 In 2015, 44 percent of the UK’s 
goods and services were exported to the EU, while 53 percent of the UK’s imports came from 
the EU. In the same year, UK exports to the EU were valued at £222.9 billion and UK imports 
from the EU totalled £290.9 billion, leaving a trade deficit of £68 billion.136 
 
In 2015, the UK had a trade surplus in goods and services of £29.3 billion with non-EU 
countries. The UK exported goods and services to non-EU countries valued at £285.9 billion, 
while its imports were worth £256.6 billion. 
 
The table below sets out the most recent statistics on trade between the UK and EU and non-
EU countries:  
 
UK Trade with EU and Non-EU Countries, 2015: Goods and Services 
 Exports (£ billion) Imports (£ billion) Balance (£ billion) 
EU 222.9 290.9 -68.0 
Non-EU  285.9 256.6 +29.3 
Total 508.8 547.4 -38.7 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Balance of Payments—April to June 2016, 
30 September 2016, Tables B and C. Figures have been rounded and may not sum.  
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4.2 Issues 
 
Outlook for the Economy 
 
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Chief Economist Nick Vaughan, in the 
short term the referendum result for the UK to leave the EU appears to have left the UK 
economy “largely undisrupted”.137 His recent assessment continued:  
 
Growth has continued at roughly the same rate seen for the past few years with our 
large and relatively robust services sector still significantly outperforming the rest of the 
economy. 
 
On the downside, the costs of raw materials have clearly started to rise due to the 
weakened pound but there is little sign yet of this feeding through to consumer prices. 
 
Of course this is only the first chapter of a long story. As well as continuing to survey 
many thousands of households and businesses, ONS is developing innovative data 
sources that will help to provide an even more timely and comprehensive picture of the 
post-referendum economy.138 
 
A recent ONS statistical bulletin has further commented on the fall in the value of sterling since 
the referendum.139 It noted that the value of the pound fell sharply against a basket of 
currencies at the end of June and into July 2016, with the “sterling Exchange Rate Index (ERI) 
6.6 percent lower compared with the average level in June 2016, and 15.0 percent lower 
compared with July 2015”. The bulletin noted that the exchange rate “showed some signs of 
stabilising” in August and September 2016, with “sterling falling at a slower rate (1.3 percent) in 
August 2016, and experienced a slight appreciation of 0.4 percent in September 2016”. The 
ONS stated that the outcome of this recent depreciation was that, overall, there was “slightly 
more upward pressure on export and import prices for products traded with non-EU 
economies”.140  
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) has stated that the UK’s vote to leave the EU “will increase 
uncertainty in the short run”.141 The report Winter is Coming: The Outlook for the Public Finances 
in the 2016 Autumn Statement summarised its analysis of how the economic situation has 
changed since the March Budget as follows: 
 
The Bank of England and the vast majority of independent forecasters expect lower 
growth and higher household inflation now than they did before the referendum. By the 
end of the Bank forecast, in 2019 Q2, national income is 2.1 percent lower, while their 
forecast implies weak growth continuing beyond this. The average of independent 
forecasters for output in 2020 has fallen by 2.8 percent. These are in line with pre-
referendum predictions.142  
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The IFS noted that Bank of England forecast cited was “subject to higher uncertainty than 
normal”, and that there was “wide disagreement between independent forecasters on the path 
of the economy”.143 They stress that this “underlies substantial uncertainties over economic 
performance in the coming years”. 
 
On 23 November, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) stated that there was a “more 
subdued outlook for economic growth as the UK negotiates a new relationship with the 
European Union”.144 As part of its assessment of the public finances ahead of the Autumn 
Statement, the OBR forecast that the economy would grow more slowly than it forecast in 
March and revised up the budget deficit by £12.7 billion this year, “thanks primarily to weakness 
in income tax receipts that largely pre-dates the referendum”. However, some Conservative 
MPs were critical of the OBR forecasts. John Redwood (Conservative MP for Wokingham), for 
example, stated that he thought the OBR was “probably still quite wrong about 2017”, with its 
forecast “too low” and its borrowing forecast “far too high”.145 In addition, Jacob Rees-Mogg 
(Conservative MP for North East Somerset) criticised the OBR forecast for being “particularly 
gloomy on the prospects for financial services”.146  
 
As indicated by both the ONS and IFS, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the 
future trade relationship between the UK and the EU, with the future trade picture dependent 
upon the outcome of forthcoming negotiations. In addition, there is also a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the future trade relationship between the UK and non-EU countries, 
which will depend on both the outcome of negotiations between the UK and the EU and the 
outcome of formal trade negotiations between the UK and non-EU countries once the UK has 
withdrawn from the EU. The House of Commons Library has noted that economic theory and 
academic literature show a link between the openness of an economy to foreign trade and 
investment and its long term growth rates.147 The future shape of the UK’s trading relationships 
will therefore be a major factor in determining the effect of the UK’s departure from the EU on 
the economy.148 
 
Future Trade Relationship with the EU and the Rest of the World 
 
The UK’s trading arrangements after departing from the EU will be shaped by the form of the 
final agreement reached with the EU, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and other 
international trading partners. These are currently the subject of complex and interrelated 
negotiations which have yet to formally begin and there is a high degree of uncertainty as to the 
final shape these agreements may take. Lord Bridges of Headley, the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State at the Department for Exiting the European Union, has described the status 
of the UK’s trade agreements, including free trade agreements following withdrawal, as being 
part of a multi-dimension negotiation.149 He said that this was intertwined with negotiation with 
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the EU as part of the Article 50 process, the process for the repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972, and settling arrangements for the future status of the UK as an 
independent member of the WTO.150 
 
It has been widely reported that there are a number of possible options for the future trade 
relationship between the UK and the EU, ranging from joining the European Economy Area 
(EEA) to trading under WTO terms.151 These options are set out in a table produced by the 
UK in a Changing Europe Initiative included in the Appendix. However, the Prime Minister, 
Theresa May, gave an indication of the Government’s approach to negotiating the UK’s trade 
relationship with the EU after withdrawal in her speech to the Conservative Party conference 
in October 2016, which also touched upon the Government’s other negotiation objectives:  
 
[…] we will seek the best deal possible as we negotiate a new agreement with the 
European Union. I want that deal to reflect the kind of mature, cooperative relationship 
that close friends and allies enjoy. I want it to include cooperation on law enforcement 
and counter-terrorism work. I want it to involve free trade, in goods and services. I 
want it to give British companies the maximum freedom to trade with and operate in 
the single market—and let European businesses do the same here. But let me be clear. 
We are not leaving the European Union only to give up control of immigration again. 
And we are not leaving only to return to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice. 
 
As ever with international talks, it will be a negotiation, it will require some give and 
take, and while there will always be pressure to give a running commentary on the state 
of the talks, it will not be in our best interests as a country to do that. But make no 
mistake: this is going to be a deal that works for Britain.152 
 
The Financial Times reported that this speech was the “clearest sign yet” of a “clean break from 
Europe’s single market”.153 The think tank Open Europe stated that the Prime Minister’s speech 
suggested that, “rather than seeking to remain members of the single market with a few 
tweaks”, the Government’s objective was “likely to be to negotiate a bilateral and as 
comprehensive a free trade agreement with the EU as possible, although the Government is 
still yet to make this explicit”.154 This analysis matches the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s position that negotiating a bespoke free trade agreement would be a “likely path 
to follow” if the UK voted to leave the EU.155 The Government has since confirmed that it 
intends to take a “bespoke approach” to future trade relations with the EU.156  
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The complex nature of the forthcoming negotiation and the high level of uncertainty regarding 
its outcome and timing is highlighted by comments made by EU office holders in the light of the 
Government’s stated objectives. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, has 
stated the EU would not compromise with the UK on the rules for the free movement of 
people while allowing the UK to retain its current level of access to the single market.157 The 
European Commission’s chief negotiator for the forthcoming negotiation, Michel Barnier, has 
reaffirmed the EU’s position that there will be “no negotiation without notification” of the 
invocation of Article 50 by the UK.158 The European Parliament’s chief negotiator, Guy 
Verhofstadt, has called for the conclusion of the UK’s negotiation with the rest of the bloc 
before the next elections to the European Parliament, scheduled for 2019.159  
 
The Government’s pursuit of a bespoke agreement raises a number of issues for various 
sectors of the economy, with it currently being unclear whether the UK will want, or be able 
to, retain the current level of access to the single market for goods and services following 
withdrawal from the EU. The nature of the future relationship between the UK and EU 
therefore has significant implications for all sectors. It has been noted that the financial services 
sector is of especial importance to the UK economy.160 The degree of connection between the 
UK financial services sector and other economies in the EU is substantial, so any changes to the 
current level of access for the sector, for example should there be changes to ‘passporting 
rights’ or equivalence rules, could have a major effect.161 The nature of the trade agreement to 
be reached between the UK and EU will have significant implications for other sectors, 
including the automotive sector. Given the high number of permutations of the outcome of the 
negotiations on the future UK-EU trade relationship, the effect of the eventual deal on various 
sectors of the UK economy is currently unknown.  
 
The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, David Davis, has stated that it was the 
Government’s ambition for the UK to become a “beacon for free trade across the world” after 
leaving the EU.162 The Secretary of State for International Trade, Dr Liam Fox, repeated this 
ambition during a speech on the subject of free trade delivered at Manchester Town Hall on 
29 September 2016.163 In this speech, he stated that trade would be at the “heart of the 
Government’s agenda” and that his department would be “working across Whitehall with the 
Treasury, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International 
Development and the new Department for Exiting the EU to ensure the UK not only leaves 
[the EU] smoothly but is at the forefront of global trade when we do”.164  
 
The UK will make arrangements relating to its membership of the WTO either in parallel or 
following its exit from the EU. Prior to the EU referendum, the Director-General of the WTO, 
Roberto Azevêdo, stated that the UK would remain a WTO member on leaving the EU but 
would need to re-establish the defined terms in the WTO for its trade in goods and services.165 
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At present the UK is bound by the EU’s schedule of commitments which is negotiated as a 
block in the WTO.166 Outside the EU, the UK would need to have its own schedule of 
commitments, setting out its terms of trade as a member of the WTO. 
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EU’ on the research briefings page of the UK Parliament website. 
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Appendix: Possible Options for the Future Trade Relationship Between 
the UK and the EU 
 
 
 
Source: UK in a Changing Europe, Brexit and Beyond: How the United Kingdom Might Leave the 
European Union, November 2016, p 25 
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